Muslims Left to Fend for Themselves in Modi Era

The 2019 electoral verdict has pushed India’s Muslims into a corner. They are asking deep existential questions about their own future and what lies ahead for liberalism and pluralism in the country. Thousands of years of history are said to underpin India’s secular and multicultural ethos. But Muslim groups are wondering if modern secularism has gone defunct in India simply because it always was just skin deep.

The alarming revelation after the 2019 election was that in roughly 45% of seats in Parliament (247 out of 543) more than 50% of Hindu voters mobilised in favour of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and its allies, who now constitute the second NDA government.

This has got the community wondering about the reasons for a dramatic surge in favour of the BJP. The rapid unravelling of the ethos of coexistence is fuelling disquiet among Muslims. They are wondering if the fraying of secularism was encoded into the freedom movement after it acquired a mass character in the 1920s.

They are also wondering why the BJP could secure this victory despite the fact that the NDA regime, during its first term from 2014 to 2019, performed badly on all parameters of economic development, employment-generation in particular. To them, the scale of BJP’s victory can be explained only by a deep-seated hatred of Muslims amongst the majority community. Another indication of this deep polarisation is that most Muslim contestants in the 2019 election only won on those seats where the share of Muslims in the population was close to 50% or higher.

Despite the frequent lynching of Muslims and other atrocities, the political parties that have enjoyed power because of the community’s votes, have increasingly distanced themselves. Samajwadi Party (SP) chief Akhilesh Yadav has remained absent or silent when crucial Bills were debated in July. Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD) chief Tejashwi Yadav went missing not only from the Bihar Assembly but from public life for several weeks after the verdict. Both of them are yet to re-appear, even in the media.

In short, at least in North and East India, Muslims have been left to fend for themselves, while the South is increasingly getting communalised.

In such a scenario, Muslims are increasingly turning to their civil society networks and advocacy groups. These informal networks of policymakers and administrators, who help them engage with government policy and strive for justice in cases of atrocities, were on the rise even before 2014. Most of these networks are small and lack human and material resources. Plus, they are localised efforts. Yet, these groups have responded to those hapless Muslims who need rehabilitation or have judicial battles to fight. These informal networks are also trying to contribute to capacity-building among Muslim communities.

The lack of socio-economic development among most Muslim communities has resulted in a very weak civil society. Because of this, even before the BJP’s recent victories—when majoritarianism had a lower intensity or had remained hidden—they were denied development and policies catering to their needs.

On the issues of caste and gender-based justices, both their clergy and the modern educated intelligentsia has failed Muslim communities. The so-called secular regimes often supported reactionary forces within the Muslims. At the same time, a few articulate educated Muslims were co-opted by these secular regimes.

The demolition of the Babri Masjid on December 6, 1992 had also triggered a wave of introspection amongst the Muslims, in which they were forced to confront their future in India. At the time, a few “Muslim intelligentsia meets” were held, in which the failures of all shades of their leadership were discussed and articulated. More importantly, there were greater concerns about capacity-building among the Muslim groups.

An important distinction between then the post-Babri scenario and today is that until the 1990s, the media and intelligentsia mostly tread the liberal-secular line and cared about truth and responsibility. The exceptions were the regional editions of vernacular print media, who brazenly communalised the social space.

Now, the corporate owned 24x7 television news channels have ominously changed the scenario. Earlier, there were suspicions about Muslims among a large number of Hindus. Now there is open hatred — and a very deep one —and a rapidly growing number of Hindus subscribe to it.

The economic liberalisation in the 1990s has had a significant impact on the socio-economic condition of Muslims in many parts of India. These changes and their political fallout remain under-explored, both academically and in journalism. This needs to change.

Most Muslim communities have traditionally been artisans or skilled workers, employed in the informal sector, followed by industries and the construction sector. A significant number of Muslims employed as mechanics, painters, electricians, puncture-makers, brick-layers, masons, drivers, etc., overcame their poverty in the 1990s and visibly gained affluence in the growing economy.

The younger generation born to these relatively better-off Muslim families, were able to access a modicum of employable education in courses offered by institutions such as the Industrial Training Institutes (ITIs) and another section went to polytechnics where they earned diplomas in accountancy, marketing, sales, and so on.

In an era of agrarian and rural distress, a section of Muslims, therefore, could improve their economic conditions. Their employment in Gulf countries spurred this affluence too. Thus a “neo-rich” segment was born among the Muslim communities.

Over the same period, the Hindus of the corresponding class, relatively speaking, lagged behind. In them the newfound affluence of the neo-rich Muslims aroused jealousy and hatred. To demonstrate their newfound status, the better-off Muslims engaged in demonstrative religiosity and consumerism. Pompous Eid-e-Milad-un-Nabi, bike-racing on Shab-e-Barat, construction of big, bright mosques with tall spires and domes, added to the scorn and disdain of Hindus. This phenomenon may partly explain why Hindus in states such as Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan harbour anti-Muslim hatred despite the fact that Muslims are only 5.7% and 9.1% of their respective population.

The kith and kin of the neo-rich Muslims had begun to offer economic competition in local trades, especially in the village bazaars and town mohallas. In recent decades, as the cost of joining politics rose, even local body elections became fairly expensive. This section of Muslims invested in these elections and their representation began to rise. This especially took place in Bihar, West Bengal and Uttar Pradesh. This further sparked jealousies along communal lines.

This is how Muslim presence in public spaces could be depicted as a “threat” to the Hindus. Such is the lumpenisation and communalisation of politics that a Hindu goon is now seen only as a goon whereas a Muslim goon is regarded a foreign-funded terrorist.

Since the 1980s, broadly-speaking, the forces of social justice claimed a share in power, edging out the upper caste domination of politics. This “Mandal era” thrived on overwhelming electoral support from the Muslim communities. All attempts, strategies, permutations and combinations of the upper castes during this period failed to help them regain their lost pre-eminence.

Through these diverse political and economic scenarios, the Muslims never staked a claim for a bigger share in power from those who controlled the upper echelons of the Mandal era political outfits. This tendency of the Muslims helped the Congress party in the years preceding the 1990s. Similarly, it proved beneficial for the Mandal regimes of the 1990s.

The Mandal regimes became content in drawing support from the subaltern sections but very often they scored electoral victories with the backing of only one social group. They became smug and arrogant and continued to alienate a major chunk of the backward class base, whose aspirations they were meant to represent. Over time these parties have reduced themselves to dynasties controlled by families and they largely represent the interests of specific dominant backward castes.

The economic aspirations released by the liberalised economy threatened the Mandal regimes. Their votes found Muslims (who used to vote for the SP, the Bahujan Samaj Party, and RJD) a stumbling block in the path of their aspirations. This fuelled the anti-Muslim sentiment in Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh and other parts of the country. The BJP tapped into this sentiment, unleashing its core base of the upper castes and the lower segments of the backward and Dalit castes.

Besides, the elite castes, along with dalits and the backwards, have also been made to feel threatened and insecure on account of the inclusion of Muslim Ajlaf communities into the category of backward class reservation. The prospect of inclusion of Muslim Arzal communities into the Scheduled Caste category would further affect the share of the dalits in reservations.

The historian Nandini Gooptu in her book, The Politics of the Urban Poorin early Twentieth Century India (2001), explains the economic competition, the rivalry in urban spaces and the resultant communal conflicts between the subaltern Hindu communities and the Muslims. She brings out the municipal and police excesses against Muslims and the resultant competitive communalisation with great clarity. Her study offers many insights into our times.

During the Congress and Mandal eras, Muslims rarely got justice but the party in power, its key leaders, and therefore the state administrations, did speak to them soothingly. They made promises to dispense justice to the Muslims. These gestures were a psychological balm if nothing else.

Now, aggressors against Muslims get open support from ministers of government. Important leaders of the party in power feel empowered to exclude, ignore, insult or attack them. As a result, administrative officials feel incentivised to demonstrate their anti-Muslim and partisan roles. This makes India’s Muslims even more frustrated and inward-looking. Ever since September 11, 2001 the Muslim identity has been vilified on a global scale. This further helped the Hindutva forces marginalise and vilify them.

A significant segment of Muslims has now realised that they have to fend for themselves. This is why they are seeking to build capacity in education. They are looking up to civil society and advocacy groups who can help them in in any way possible.

For instance, in many WhatsApp groups, appeals are being made to develop mosques as institutions to mobilise charity funds. There are also demands for delivery of social services, health-care, dispute-resolution and redressal. They are pursuing causes such as low-cost marriages and frugal festivities. Their aim is to channelise these funds towards education, health and hygiene, and so on.

Such exercises, though positive, may unwittingly degenerate into insularity, exclusion and further fray inclusive, pluralistic and syncretic co-existence. Inward-looking everyday lives may perpetuate reactionary ideologies, including patriarchic regressivism (as the outpourings of many Muslims on invalidation and criminalisation of the un-Quranic instant triple talaq suggest). This needs to be taken care of.

Civil society groups, therefore, need to be strengthened more vigorously. Their interventions would influence the community and stop a slide into regressivism.

Muslims have reasons to mistrust the system, including the police and judiciary. But they are hoping against hope. They are putting their trust in the notion that every government department may have a few who will muster up the courage to stand up for them, against all odds. On this basis, the Muslims have persuaded themselves to wage judicial battles against atrocities such as lynching.

Though on a very localised scale, through social media, sections of the Muslims are trying to mobilise to react to local incidents as well. It is a fact that even their agitations and processions for their rights are not led by any known political leaders today.

Such a scenario has also come true for dalits. Their tall and senior political leaders are not to be seen in any of their mobilisation. Nevertheless, dalits can still strive to impose a Bharat Bandh (as they did in April 2018) in seeking protection of their rights. Muslims cannot take up such an agitation. Should they do so, they will be portrayed as anti-national, enemies of the country—their mobilisation would be used to enhance Hindu consolidation.

With the legislation of the amended Unlawful Activities Prevention (UAPA) Act, the state is going to become more repressive. Civil society groups are likely to become immediate targets of the plenipotentiary authoritarian regime. Reports say that there is an acute down-slide in the economy. With this, Right wing authoritarianism is likely to become more assertive. Concomitantly, the persecution of Muslims will be whipped up even more. This helps deflect from the real issues and cover up the failures of the regime on the economic front. History has examples of the destruction wrought by Right wing authoritarianism, and their eventual nemesis. One can only pray they overcome these ominous odds.

Mohammad Sajjad is Professor, Centre of Advanced Study in History, Aligarh Muslim University. The views are personal.