Limited Outcomes, Difficult Future: The Doha Climate Talks and After

As the 18th annual meeting of the Conference of Parties (COP18) of the UNFCCC drew to a close at Doha, with the predictable late-night flurry of neg

otiations and the extension of the meeting beyond its scheduled duration, there was little cheer within the conference as well as outside in the

larger arena of global public opinion. The continuation of the Kyoto Protocol to a second commitment period, despite all the weaknesses of the final decision, was Doha's major positive outcome. But the difficulties in the road ahead were signalled by the overt and unambiguous insistence of the United States that it wanted the basic principles of the UNFCCC on equity and common but differentiated responsibilities set aside, while negotiating a global agreement as envisaged under the Durban Platform.

The agreement to continue the Kyoto Protocol and  initiate a second commitment period, of eight years duration, during which the developed countries are to undertake  further emission reduction commitments, was undoubtedly an important success for developing countries. However the Kyoto Protocol had been left considerably weakened by the absence of commitments from key nations, Japan, Russia and New Zealand, and the withdrawal of Canada that joined big brother United States in staying outside the Protocol. As for those developed countries that still adhere to the Protocol, of which the European Union is the most significant, their emission reduction commitments still fell far short of what their contributions ought to be according to the Inter-Governmental Panel on Climate Change's (IPCC) Fourth Assessment Report. In aggregate the developed countries have only agreed to reduce emissions by 18% below 1990 levels by 2020, though they need to reduce between 25%-40%. Of course, to expect any more from the adherents to the Kyoto Protocol is unrealistic, given that some major developed nations have not made any commitments at all.

The actual quantum of these commitments will be announced by several of the respective countries in the days to come. In another positive move, these commitments are to be revisited in 2014, in order to examine how to make them more substantial and in line with the IPCC recommendations.
Further evidence of the tortuous course that the climate negotiations would continue to take in the future came from the  final discussions in the Ad-Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperation and Action (AWG-LCA). Following the decisions of COP 17 at Durban last year, this negotiating track, that was initiated in Bali in 2007, was to conclude its work at Doha. That was of course finally achieved but at the cost of not having made any substantial progress on the majority of key issues that were being discussed in this negotiating track. There was considerable wrangling and dispute over the first version of the concluding text presented by the Chairperson that the developing countries felt was being thrust on them and did  not adequately reflect their views or the actual progress of the discussions.

At Doha, the AWG-LCA track concluded without any progress on access to emission reduction technologies and intellectual property rights or the broader question of climate finance (beyond the limited progress made so far on immediate climate finance, referred to as “fast-track finance”). Some progress was achieved earlier at COP 16 at Cancun with the  setting up of the Technology Mechanism to facilitate technology transfer, which however skirted the IPR issue. On climate finance the final plenary session of COP18 added an exhortation to developed countries to work to achieve the target of  100 billion US dollars per year by 2020, but given the trickle that has emerged by way of “fast-track” finance, this exhortation means little.
Other issues from the AWG-LCA were moved to various other negotiating forums that are part of the UNFCCC. The most significant failure of the AWG-LCA track of negotiations, as is well-known, has been the absence of the slightest progress towards a meaningful long-term mitigation strategy that would ensure that the developed countries undertook sharp reductions in their emissions. But with the passage of the Durban Platform at COP 17 held in Durban last year, this key agenda item of the AWG-LCA had of course been rendered moot.

A significant feature of the AWG-LCA track in the negotiations was that it covered five major issues including a shared vision of long-term cooperation, mitigation, adaptation, technology transfer and finance. India, along with several other developing countries, had always insisted that all five elements must be dealt with together in a balanced manner and that specific aspects of each of these issues must not be singled out for action. Unfortunately in practice it has proved difficult to ensure such an outcome. With the winding up of the AWG-LCA such a balance will be even more difficult to attain to the detriment of the interests of developing nations.

While the KP and the AWG-LCA occupied the  centre-stage at the negotiations, the work of the ADP (Ad-Hoc Group on the Durban Platform) moved ahead. In a significant development, a time-line of the work of the Durban Platform has emerged. A negotiating text is to be presented no later than May, 2015 , following discussions on a draft text at COP 20 in 2014, which is to be then ratified that year at COP 21. Further, the UN Secretary-General is to convene a high-level meeting of world leaders in 2014 to discuss climate change.

The evidence from the Doha negotiations on the Durban Platform, as was already becoming evident at Durban last year, point to a concerted attempt by the developed nations, led by the United States, to undermine the basic principles of the UNFCCC in arriving at a global climate agreement. Since Durban, the United States has steadfastly insisted on excluding the terms equity and common but differentiated responsibility from the actual text of the Durban Platform. While the compromise “under the principles of the Convention” had been included, at Doha the United States refused to abide by this compromise. While the other nations accepted it, the US announced in the plenary session that while not blocking the decision on the Durban Platform it would not accept that the agreement on the Durban Platform would be negotiated under the basic principles of the UNFCCC. In the negotiations, the United States even ruled out a reference to some relevant parts of even the Rio+20 document, “The future we want”, that they had agreed a little over five months ago.

It is clear that this is going to be the major game-plan of the United States in the next three years in the run-up to the formulation of a global climate agreement and that  such a strategy would have serious negative consequences for a large number of countries in the developing world. However as the experience of Durban showed, there is serious danger that in the pursuit of a climate agreement at all costs, some developing countries may move over to the camp of the developed countries.
In the context of the evolving debate on the form and content of the eventual agreement under the Durban Platform, it is interesting to note the various alignments between different nations that were evident at Doha. Fortunately for the developing countries, there were no serious breaks in their ranks at the time of the final Ministerial segment of the conference. This is undoubtedly, in part at least, a carry over of the unity of the G77 that was very evident at Rio+20. Nor did any serious attempt to move forward with some specifically new suggestions emerge from the developed countries that posed a threat to G77 unity. In any case, while the developing countries were increasingly frustrated by the stalling indulged in by the Annex-I parties in the context of Kyoto Protocol, the latter certainly could not gain any moral or political ground with their unambitious and inadequate emission reduction commitments.

Over the year since Durban other developments also ensured that the developing countries, especially the large ones such as China and India, could not easily be subject to pressure. The weaknesses of the BASIC grouping were evident in the inauguration of the Durban Platform where the two Asian nations evidently did not pursue the same course as Brazil and South Africa. However a new grouping has emerged with some 23 nations involved that refers to itself as the coalition of Like-Minded Group of Developing Countries (LMDC) that includes China and India, but does not include Brazil and South Africa. Other countries include Algeria, Argentina, Bolivia, China, Cuba, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Dominica, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, India, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Malaysia, Mali, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Venezuela. The coalition, that was inaugurated, with a meeting in Beijing earlier this year, appears to mark a closer convergence of views especially on the issues surrounding the Durban Platform, namely the form and content of a global climate agreement. At no point at Doha did India find itself in a situation similar to the one that emerged late in the Durban negotiations.
But it would be incorrect to underestimate the seriousness of the situation that India  faces on the climate front. The United States has given notice that it intends to undermine the basic principles of the UNFCCC and may be guaranteed to pull a significant section, or perhaps even all, of the developed world into its orbit on this question. India's attempt to push equity on to the agenda, while undoubtedly gaining traction among the developing countries at Doha, will be resisted aggressively by the United States, the European Union and other developed nations. With the winding up of the AWG-LCA and the absence of any reference to equity in the Durban Platform, India may not even find the negotiating space to bring up this issue for consideration, though the LMDC coalition is a promising counter-move against this danger.

But India also needs a much larger, more encompassing vision of how to handle the global climate agenda, and to then  evolve overall goals and specific negotiating strategies within the scope of such a vision. Within such a vision it must ensure that it obtains enough development space, especially in terms of specific global carbon space. At the same time we must remember that increasing climate impacts will have serious negative consequences for significant sections of the Indian population, especially the poor.

Given the time-line of the Durban Platform it is clear that we do not have much time to evolve such a vision through effective consultations, debates and discussion with all stakeholders and representatives of all sections of Indian public opinion. It remains to be seen whether the government of the day will find the time and energy to undertake this critical task.