The Changing Strategic Posture of US

The bourgeoisie in the United States and its state (UBAS) currently confront an objective reality whereby their imperialist hegemony (of the unipolar variety) has been put into question. The strategic concord between China and Russia has achieved an alternative pole in international political economy. The strength of this pole in terms of economic and military power is of an order of magnitude that cannot be successfully confronted by UBAS. 

The military asymmetry between the US on the one hand and China and Russia on the other, which spans both nuclear and conventional weapons, is fairly evident for all (including many policymakers in the US, at least some of whom are publicly articulating facts about this asymmetry, albeit with varying degrees of obliqueness), whose information is not derived from Hollywood or its derivatives. 

Moreover, the relative strength of China in the production of manufactured commodities and Russia in the production of primary commodities ensures a near-vertical integration of production networks in both countries. Consequently, unilateral sanctions are failing in attaining the objective of dual containment (of China and Russia by UBAS) as evidenced by the outcome of the ongoing economic war against Russia. 

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The strategic posture of dual containment is contrary to objective reality and, therefore, is unlikely to succeed unless one or more of the following three conditions are fulfilled. 

One, the fracturing of the strategic concord between China and Russia. While there do exist contradictions between these two countries, this is unlikely to lead to a fracturing of the strategic concord as long as their concerns about the imperialist hegemony of UBAS are relevant. 

Two, a revolutionary technological breakthrough under US imperialist hegemony that cannot be rapidly matched by either China or Russia. The US does retain a significant capacity for invention. However, China has by now either surpassed or equaled the US in almost all areas of frontier technologies. Therefore, the unilateral export controls and related coercive measures imposed by UBAS against China are increasingly failing.

Where such coercive measures could bite, China has at least two potential counter-measures. First, counter-sanctions involving critical materials. Second, China is a significant market for the output of many metropolitan capitalist firms subject to the export controls and sanctions of UBAS.

This gives rise to a contradiction between profits of such firms and the effectiveness of these coercive measures against China. In order to see why, consider the problem from the perspective of such metropolitan firms. If they believe that China will develop alternative production networks to produce their high-technology output regardless of the unilateral measures of UBAS, then they will be less inclined to comply with these unilateral measures. 

Three, the emergence of global production networks spanning all reaches of the technological ladder in a few countries of the Global South (outside China and Russia). It is not evident how this is possible without relying on Chinese manufactured commodities and Russian primary commodities at least for some decades.

Therefore, even if this emergence does transpire, with or without the inducement of UBAS, there is no guarantee that the governments and ruling classes of these countries in the Global South will be willing to operate within the imperialist hegemony of UBAS. There also remain significant questions about whether the continued direct and indirect supply of primary commodities from the Global South to metropolitan capital (and therefore the prevalence of relative price stability) is compatible, within the framework of the capitalist system, with such an industrial breakthrough in some countries of the Global South (outside China and Russia). 

None of these three possibilities are likely to transpire in the future, and therefore faced with these realities, the UBAS is being compelled to abandon the untenable dual containment strategy in favour of attempts to drive a wedge in the strategic concord between China and Russia. 

This wedge strategy underlies recent political theatrics, such as the performative rhetoric of figures like Trump. These theatrics are part of a broader effort to legitimise the intent by UBAS to make some concessions to Russia in Europe in order to try and strategically isolate China.

Variants of this theatrics include claims that an end to the armed component of the conflict will ostensibly weaken the Russian economy, which is ostensibly driven principally by military spending; the deal regarding minerals between metropolitan capital and the Zelensky administration will provide a peace dividend; preposterous claims that the military and economic strength of European segment of metropolitan capital is sufficient to adequately supply the Zelensky administration in Ukraine; demands that Zelensky must either resign or be replaced by someone who is more inclined towards ending the armed component of the conflict in Ukraine. All of these claims, demands, and related manoeuvres reflect the heterogeneous means to manufacture consent for the same outcome—namely, strategic concessions to Russia by UBAS. 

The criticism of the Trump Presidency by cosmopolitan neoliberals (who believe that integration with metropolitan capital under the hegemony of UBAS is benign for the people of all countries, including Ukraine), irrespective of the form of the criticism, amounts to a questioning of the mode of the sequencing of the moves from dual containment strategy to the wedge strategy.

It is possible that a Harris Presidency in the US (had Kamala Harris been elected) would have, in all likelihood, adopted the same sequencing (with minor variations perhaps) but communicated it in a language that is in sync with the conventions and idioms of cosmopolitan neoliberals.

The gauche theatrics of the neo-fascist clique driving the Trump Presidency, therefore, impel cosmopolitan neoliberals to accuse Trump or his associates of being explicit or implicit acolytes of Russia. However, if the Trump Presidency or any other administration were to actually act contrary to the interests of UBAS, then such leaders would have been subjected not merely to verbal critiques but criticism by weapons wielded by the agents of UBAS. 

The more heterogeneity there is in these theatrics—including “debates” and “agency”—the more secure will the consent be that is consequently manufactured for the proposed transition from the strategy of dual containment to the wedge strategy. 

Key architects of this strategic shift to prioritise containment of China, such as Elbridge Colby, articulate this shift in the strategy of UBAS with possibly the least possible theatrics that is compatible with the political priorities of the neo-fascist clique that is driving the Trump Presidency. 

However, Russia is aware of the predicament that confronts UBAS and, therefore, will drive a hard bargain that may weaken the imperialist hegemony of UBAS with respect to other segments of metropolitan capital in Europe. The Trump Presidency’s imperialist manoeuvres regarding Panama, Greenland, West Asia, etc., are therefore attempts to shore up its heft to prepare for the day after such strategic concessions to Russia are made. 

Yet this approach cannot resolve the fundamental contradiction confronting the imperialist hegemony of UBAS: Even if strategic concessions are made to Russia in Europe, will these be adequate to drive a sufficient wedge between China and Russia? If these strategic concessions breach a threshold level, will UBAS be able to securely pool the resources of all segments of metropolitan capital to try and contain China? 

Fundamentally, the crisis of strategy of UBAS stems from the incompatibility between its imperialist hegemony and objective realities of contemporary international political economy.

The writer is Professor, Department of Economics, Satyawati College, University of Delhi. The views are personal.